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Chongwoo Choe and Iain Fraser*
In recent years reducing the amount of waste generated by households has become
an important policy issue in industrialised economies. It is no longer acceptable
to discard waste without concern for environmental and natural resource issues. In
an e¡ort to reduce household waste various policy instruments such as kerbside
charges, deposit-refund schemes, integrated sales tax exemptions and virgin
material taxes, have been proposed and/or implemented. This article reviews the
economics literature that has addressed household waste management. It is argued
that a comprehensive modelling framework is necessary if the complex policy
environment is to be accurately described.
1. Introduction
In recent years how society should deal with household waste has become a
signi¢cant policy issue in industrialised economies. It is no longer acceptable
to discard waste materials without concern for environmental and natural
resource issues. The concern relates to resource scarcity for the production of
consumption goods and the need to recover (recycle or reuse) waste
materials, as well as the external e¡ects, such as water pollution and site
contamination at land¢lls, and littering resulting from the illegal disposal of
the waste. The desire for improved household waste management is part of
the greater emphasis placed upon environmental issues openly articulated at
the 1992 Earth Summit. Take for example Agenda 21, which expresses the
requirement for sustainable economic activity and the need for mankind to
remain in harmony with the carrying capacity of the earth.
Like many nations, Australia has developed policies and initiatives to deal
with household waste. In 1992 the Australian Commonwealth government
declared a target of halving domestic waste going to land¢ll by the year
2000. Accompanying this target were related recycling targets for materials
such as paper, glass and aluminium. These initiatives have the support of
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is strong. In a recent survey of Melbourne households (RRRC 1994) 76 per
cent thought that it was very important for communities to cut down on the
waste generated. Furthermore, 91 per cent of those interviewed undertook
varying degrees of kerbside recycling.
Similar policy initiatives have been introduced in other parts of the world.
For example, in the 1990 Environmental Protection Act, the UK government
committed itself to reducing waste and promoting the amount of recycling.
A target of 25 per cent of household waste to be recycled was set. In Germany
the Packing Ordinance was passed in 1991. The law was introduced in
recognition of the fact that about half of all municipal solid waste on a volume
basis was packaging. The Ordinance is a cradle-to-grave approach to waste
management with the emphasis for action (collecting, sorting and recycling
packaging) falling on producers. Responsibility for packaging waste disposal
requires industry to pay for waste management. In order to e¡ect this scheme,
industry formed the Duales System Deutsch (the Green Dot System). This is
a non-pro¢t organisation which is made up of fee-paying companies whose
contributions go towards operating the organisation. This approach to waste
management recognises the complex nature of the waste generation process
and the need to involve related economic agents.
1 The European Union has
agreed upon a community-wide packaging directive which sets minimum and
maximum targets for recovery and recycling. In the United States and Canada
individual states have introduced various initiatives, such as household
kerbside charges (user-pays) schemes for household waste disposal as an
incentive to reduce the amount of waste generated.
2 At the production stage,
certain US states have introduced recycled content standards requiring
producers to employ a given fraction of secondary materials (Palmer and
Walls 1997). In addition to the above policies, many countries have also
introduced eco/green labelling programmes as a means to inform consumers
about the environmental impact of purchases (Menell 1995).
Government intervention in waste management is often rationalised
because many of the costs (noxious smells, disease, environmental degrada-
tion) of waste generation and disposal are external in nature and
decentralised markets cannot fully internalise them. An important decision in
implementing and e¤ciently achieving any policy targets is thus the choice
and combination of economic instruments and environmental regulation
1Brisson (1993), Rousso and Shah (1994) and Michaelis (1995) review the Green Dot
scheme.
2For more on various countries' waste management policies, see Macdonald et al. 1996,
chapter 10.
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well-conceived policy.
A commonly articulated policy proposal as part of the solution to the
underpricing is the introduction of kerbside charges for the collection and
disposal of household waste. For example, the Industry Commission (1996)
3
as part of its investigation into packaging and labelling recommended that:
In so far as is practical, waste disposal charges should be fed down to
individual decision makers in the waste chain. In particular, post consumer
waste collected at the kerbside should move more fully towards user
pays systems with users billed according to use. (Recommendation 6,
p. XXVII)
A similar recommendation has been made by Macdonald et al. (1996), in
an evaluation of Australian e¡orts to reduce waste and encourage greater
levels of recycling. This approach to reducing the stream of household waste
has been considered at length in the literature. The reason for this is easy
to understand. Typically, households make a £at-rate payment for waste
disposal services through local government rates. This means that house-
holds face zero price at the margin for generating additional rubbish. An
increase in the £at-rate payment only provides incentives via the income
e¡ect and as waste disposal costs are only a small portion of household
income, the income elasticity of waste disposal is low (Wertz 1976). It is
therefore argued that kerbside charges should re£ect household marginal
costs of waste disposal. But it is not entirely clear if this policy recommenda-
tion is economically justi¢ed. It can be demonstrated that kerbside charges
need not be a ¢rst-best economic solution because they may lead the
household to choose the option of illegal disposal to avoid the charges.
Controlling illegal disposal involves additional costs, i.e. monitoring and
enforcement. From a social cost perspective The Economist (1993) suggests
that the costs incurred as a result of illegal dumping are signi¢cantly greater
than the costs of e¤ciently operating a land¢ll. If additional costs of
enforcing legal household waste disposal are too high, then it may be more
e¤cient to target waste generation at the production stage through
environmental taxes which can reduce waste at the source of production.
4 In
general, user fees, environmental taxes and monitoring and enforcement are
interdependent and it is not possible to choose an optimal combination of
3The Industry Commission (1991) made similar recommendations, albeit with several
caveats in relation to implementation.
4Hatch and Mules (1993) provide an interesting Australian case study of the necessary
size of a packaging tax to internalise external costs.
Economics of household waste management 271
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998policy tools that can be applied to all types of household waste. Other
concerns expressed about household waste management policy relate to, for
example, recycling rates and targets. Baumol (1977) notes that there is an
`aura of unmixed virtue that surrounds recycling activities' (p. 83), and that
there is no reason a priori to assume that the marginal net product of
recycling is positive. It is therefore interesting to ask if we are undertaking
too much household waste recycling in Australia and whether or not other
methods of waste management, such as land¢ll, are to be preferred
economically, despite being unpopular with environmental groups.
In this article we review the theoretical and empirical economics literature
on household waste management. In particular we focus on kerbside
charges/user fees, evaluating their feasibility as a policy option. It is found
that the broad policy recommendations are only optimal under certain
conditions and that policy needs to become speci¢cally focused. The type of
waste to be disposed of needs to be explicitly taken into account, considering
the disposal incentives faced by the household. Throughout the article
(speci¢cally sections 2 and 5) policy issues are mostly focused on Australia.
In section 2 we begin by brie£y detailing the existing legislation relating to
household waste management in Australia. Section 3 provides an informal
analysis of the basic economic principles underlying household waste
management and categorisation of policy instruments. In section 4 the
theoretical and empirical literature on waste management is critically
reviewed. Given the ¢ndings of the earlier sections, in section 5 we identify
areas which require further research and policy development for Australia.
2. Household waste management in Australia
It is estimated that every Australian produces 1 metric tonne of post-
consumer waste per year (Macdonald et al. 1996). In terms of individual
households elsewhere in the world, DSD (1995) estimate that household
waste per capita in kilograms is 701 in the United States, 400 in Japan and
348 in France. In Australia the largest components of this waste are paper
and cardboard, non-¢bre biodegradable waste and glass. Although there has
been a large increase in the amount of waste being recycled, it still only
accounts for a third of the total post-consumer waste stream. Of this third,
paper, cardboard and glass account for almost all materials recycled.
5
5A trend observed in the United States is that between 1960 and 1993 household waste
doubled in weight. The plastic component increased forty-eight times, while aluminium only
doubled. For land¢ll pressures, plastic's volume share in the waste stream is roughly double
its weight (Hadjilambrinos 1996).
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economy when primary industries (mining, agriculture, etc.) are included
(Industry Commission 1996).
2.1 Federal waste management strategies and legislation
In Australia, environmental legislation and planning are carried out by
individual State governments rather than the Commonwealth, with most
policies and strategies developed by cooperation between the Commonwealth
and the States. In terms of household waste management and recycling, local
government plays the most signi¢cant role in waste management and litter
control. In all States either local government or special waste management
authorities have responsibility for the collection, treatment and disposal of
solid waste. They also have charge over collection and on-sale of recyclable
materials pursuant to State legislation. However, it is the State that
establishes policy which directly impinges upon waste management
functions. At present in Australia all States and Territory governments are
establishing waste minimisation legislation which will directly a¡ect local
government waste management practice (Macdonald et al. 1996).
Commonwealth waste management policy is based upon two strategies
introduced in 1992. The ¢rst is the National Waste Minimisation and
Recycling Strategy (NWMRS). The NWMRS aimed to improve recycling
collection and use, aiming for a 50 per cent reduction in total waste going to
land¢ll by the year 2000 measured by weight per capita based on 1990 levels.
Under the NWMRS, local government was set the target of adopting a waste
management plan by 1993. By 1994 it was estimated (Maunsell Pty Ltd
1994) that only 24 per cent of local councils had satis¢ed the target. The
second strategy is the National Kerbside Recycling Strategy, which
complements the NWMRS. Examples of some of the recycling targets set
under this strategy for 1995 are 45 per cent of glass, 65 per cent of
aluminium cans, 20 per cent of liquid paperboard cartons, 40 per cent of
newsprint and various levels for di¡erent types of plastic such as 50 per cent
for HDPE. Progress towards the targets for glass, newsprint and aluminium
cans has been good. For other materials, such as some of the plastic wastes,
progress is poor (Macdonald et al. 1996). These targets do not have any
legislative force, they have been negotiated with industry and are based on
achievable targets. The Federal government has been criticised for failing to
make sure that industry and local government attempt to progress towards
many of the targets (DEST 1996).
Although there are Commonwealth strategies for household waste, there
is no comprehensive Commonwealth legislation. There are only ad hoc pieces
of legislation. For example, the Commonwealth taxation law (the Taxation
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expenditure on equipment used to manage waste and control pollution.
However, legislation at the Commonwealth level targeting waste
management further down the waste chain is either absent or at best
counterintuitive. For example, recycled products are not necessarily given
tax concessions, while household compost bins are subject to local
government subsidy but they are not exempt from sales tax.
2.2 State legislation
In terms of State Government we will focus on Victoria as most employ
a similar waste management system.
6 In Victoria local government was
given the responsibility for waste management under the 1958 Local
Government Act. The Victorian Environmental Protection Authority was
established in 1970 and it has responsibility for pollution licensing, and
State policy on waste management. At present local government may
charge rates for waste management services based upon the 1989 Local
Government Act. If local government wished to implement a kerbside
charges scheme it would need to pass a local by-law. In 1992 Victoria
passed the Environmental Protection (Resource Recovery) Act which is
based upon the NWMRS.
The Victorian approach of employing land¢ll levies on local government
is in keeping with all other States and Territories. The 1992 Act included the
provision for land¢ll charges. A land¢ll levy of A$2 per tonne is paid by local
government and A$3 per tonne by other users. This revenue is used to fund
waste reduction programmes and to promote waste minimisation measures.
Finally, in all States the unlawful disposal of waste is viewed as criminal.
Each State has Litter Laws. In Victoria this is covered by the Litter Act 1987
(amended in 1991). There are on the spot ¢nes of A$600 and court-imposed
¢nes of up to A$4000, and even in certain circumstances prison. These laws
only apply to individuals.
2.3 Waste management in practice
Changes in household waste management practice have not been in
keeping with the aims of the NWMRS. As an indication, a recent survey
of Australian local councils found that land¢ll was the most economically
viable waste management option ö indeed 39 per cent of councils are
6The major exception to this is the South Australian container deposit-refund scheme.
See references cited within for more details.
274 C. Choe and I. Fraser
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998planning future land¢lls.
7 In addition, waste going to land¢ll in Victoria
rose by 25 per cent between 1990 and 1993. There is also a movement
away from kerbside recycling in Victoria and the introduction of drop-o¡
centres because of increased operational costs of collection. Where
recycling schemes have been introduced, their operational e¤ciency has
been questioned. For example, in Banyule it has been estimated by
Regional Recycling of Victoria, which sorts and sells recycled waste, that
up to 50 per cent of material is only suitable for land¢ll disposal
(Heidelberger 1997).
To date, no council in Australia has implemented kerbside charges.
There have been trials such as `Wising up to Weight' in the City of
Melbourne between 1991 and 1994 (Monash University 1995). The trial
attempted to simulate a kerbside charges system but it did not yield any
signi¢cant results due to technical di¤culties and changes in local
government boundaries. Another example was the trial in Lismore, New
South Wales where a A$2 payment was given to households who did not
put a bin out for collection. There was a recorded reduction of one third
in waste for disposal, but it was found that the costs of implementation
exceeded bene¢ts. In Wangaratta, Victoria, a ban was placed on the
disposal of recyclable materials in waste for disposal. The local council
introduced a penalty of A$400 if caught and although the law was heavily
publicised, there were no recorded prosecutions. The scheme did result in
an increase in recycling scheme participation, from 54 per cent up to 72
per cent. In addition, other local governments have introduced a variable
rate charge for di¡ering bin sizes.
With litter, packaging is the single largest contributing element, 90 per
cent. Analygon (1994) estimated that for every dollar spent in reducing
litter, over ¢ve dollars of bene¢ts are generated. The emphasis on litter
control has been through the use of public education campaigns
highlighting the impact of litter on the environment. Evidence of the
impact of legal disposal charges on littering has been noted by Waste
Service New South Wales (1995) in that they observed, albeit anecdotally,
increased illegal dumping after tipping fees were increased. In terms of
local government enforcing existing legislation, the Keep South Australia
Beautiful campaign group suggested that Adelaide was being too lenient in
that the 26 councils in the metropolitan area imposed less than 100
littering notices per year. In Victoria it is estimated that 3000 notices are
issued annually.
7For a comprehensive review of the environmental impact of land¢lls see El-Fadel et al.
(1997).
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At present there is a wide array of initiatives and strategies in place across
Australia for household waste management. Despite all these initiatives there
is no comprehensive incentive structure in place. The present situation is
more a mosaic of incentive mechanisms over the economy both within and
across tiers of government. From the review of policy it is interesting to note
that despite the introduction of Commonwealth strategies on household
waste management and recycling, local councils still show a preference for
the increased use of land¢lls. This raises the issue of whether or not the
targets set in the various strategies are optimal from an economic
perspective. In the case of Australia, which is a land-abundant country, are
the bene¢ts from reduced land¢ll use greater than the costs incurred in
collecting, separating, sorting and transforming the waste materials as a
result of recycling? To be able to address this type of question, the basic
economic principles underlying household waste management are informally
discussed in the next section.
3. Economics of household waste management: basic principles
To understand the basic economic principles underlying household waste
management, we consider it in two separate stages for convenience. In the
¢rst stage, we identify the optimal amount of waste to be generated. In the
second stage, we focus on the optimal mix of available waste management
technologies. It should be noted, however, that these two stages need to be
considered simultaneously in all practical waste management problems.
In a decentralised market mechanism, an individual economic agent
equates the private marginal bene¢ts of their economic activity with
marginal private cost (MPC) of such an activity. As household waste is the
by-product of consumption, we may naturally think of waste being generated
in some ¢xed proportion of consumption. This ¢xed proportion can change
depending on the e¡ort the household makes to reduce post-consumption
waste. Thus, the amount of waste generated will be determined when the
marginal utility of consumption (MU) is equal to the MPC of consumption,
the latter being the sum of the price of a consumption good and the price
of waste disposal services; more precisely the condition will be
MU=l  MPC where l is the marginal utility of income. The MPC fails to
re£ect full social cost of consumption, however. If both the consumption
good and the waste disposal service are priced at marginal costs, then the
di¡erence between the MPC and marginal social cost (MSC) will be
environmental externalities which, by de¢nition, evade the decentralised
276 C. Choe and I. Fraser
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998market mechanism. Thus MSC generally exceeds MPC and using the
standard externalities argument, the waste generated in a decentralised
market is above its socially optimal level. This situation is illustrated in
¢gure 1.
In ¢gure 1, the socially optimal amount of waste is W
 where MU is equal
to MSC while the decentralised market will lead to W1. The question is then
how to make decentralised decisions lead to a quantity of waste equal to W
?
Economic theory suggests various ways to solve this type of externality. The
creation of a missing market for waste will have only limited applicability.
Even if markets for recyclable waste are well established, not all wastes are
recyclable. Moreover, de¢ning property rights for the externalities, a
necessary prerequisite for setting up a market, would not be easy. Because of
this latter di¤culty, the standard Coasian bargaining solution would not be
practical in many cases. As an alternative, one can think of government
intervention in both the product market and the market for waste disposal
services. A tax on a consumption good can increase the MPC of consumption
by increasing the price of the good. The e¡ectiveness of such a tax depends
of course on the nature of demand for and supply of the consumption good.
The ¢nal increase in price of a consumption good as a result of the tax depends
on the extent to which the tax is shifted to the consumer price. A tax on waste
Figure 1 Discrepancy between MPC and MSC
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services. Thus, a suitably chosen Pigouvian tax on either the consumption
good or the waste disposal service can shift MPC up to MSC in ¢gure 1.
Although the determination of an optimal tax requires careful measurement
of environmental externalities, the argument for moving user-price closer to
full social cost is obviously in line with this reasoning.
The discussion so far is valid if one assumes that the post-consumption
waste is in a ¢xed-proportion relationship with consumption. However, the
household can also undertake e¡ort to reduce the amount of post-
consumption waste for many household goods through, for example,
reusing and composting. The household's waste reduction e¡ort will be
determined where the MPC of such e¡ort (e.g. time, e¡ort and money
spent) is equal to its marginal private bene¢ts (e.g. reduced waste disposal
cost, and bene¢ts from reuse or composting). In this case, the tax on
consumption and waste disposal service may not have the desired e¡ect.
Consider the tax on waste disposal services. If the price of waste disposal
services increases because of the tax, then the household may have an
incentive to choose an alternative disposal method, say illegal dumping, to
avoid higher disposal costs. Unless illegal dumping is monitored and
o¡enders ¢ned, the tax on waste disposal services will not shift MPC, in
¢gure 1, up to the desired position. Moreover, it is likely that MSC will
move even further up with illegal dumping, resulting in an even larger
discrepancy between MPC and MSC. This argument rests on the
assumption that illegal dumping leads to more severe environmental
externalities, seemingly an innocuous assumption. On the other hand, a low
price of waste disposal service may not give the household enough incentive
to make the waste reduction e¡ort. Any policy on direct waste disposal
services thus has to solve two con£icting goals of preventing illegal waste
disposal and encouraging waste reduction e¡ort. Such con£ict can be
resolved to a certain extent through a tax on consumption goods as it will
indirectly reduce the amount of waste generated. Note that such a tax has
only an indirect e¡ect on the household's waste reduction e¡ort which may
not lead to the optimal amount of waste, W
, in general. We can thus
conclude that, when the household can actively reduce the amount of post-
consumption waste, there is in general a unique mix of a tax on the
consumption good and a tax on waste disposal services that can achieve the
second-best level of waste generated which may not be equal to W
.
We now consider the second stage of the waste management process, the
optimal mix of waste disposal technologies. The problem of waste disposal is
more complicated than a standard externality example. This is because not
only is there a decision about the optimal quantity of waste to dispose of
(the ¢rst stage), there is also a decision to be made about the optimal mix of
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axis is the total quantity of waste to be disposed of, which is determined in
the ¢rst stage. On the left-hand vertical axis is the MC associated with one
type of waste disposal method and on the right hand we have the MC of
another. For example, the two disposal technologies might be land¢ll and
recycling. The optimal mix of waste technologies is derived by equating
MSC of both. From ¢gure 2 this yields a mix W
S. However, if we equate
their MPC we derive a di¡erent mix, W
P. It is therefore necessary for each
disposal option to be correctly priced. Otherwise the mix of waste disposal
technologies will be non-optimal. The di¡erence between the two
technologies is the di¡erence between their respective MSC and MPC. The
bigger di¡erence between MPC1 and MSC1 than for type 2 is a re£ection
that type 2 is the preferred technology from a social perspective. When the
mix of technologies is based upon MSC1  MSC2, then more of type 2
technology should be used as compared to technology mix associated with
MPC1  MPC2.
8
Figure 2 Optimal mix of waste disposal technologies
8Another important issue is service delivery and whether it should be provided by local
government directly or tendered out for private provision. See Bivand and Szymanski
(1997).
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separable in general. The marginal costs and bene¢ts described in ¢gure 1
depend on the optimal mix of waste disposal methods considered in ¢gure
2 and vice versa. Wiseman (1991) makes the same point by explaining
that total costs are minimised when the MC of alternative waste disposal
technologies are equated. Although the economic principle explained
above is based on simple diagrams, it nonetheless demonstrates an
important point: waste management needs to be analysed in a
comprehensive framework where various policy instruments targeting
consumption, waste disposal services and illegal waste disposal can be
considered simultaneously, along with the choice of waste disposal
technologies. For example, the introduction of a user-pays scheme in an
attempt to move MPC closer to MSC in ¢gure 1 may not achieve the
intended outcome if the household chooses the option of illegal waste
disposal. On the other hand, keeping the price of waste disposal services
low will not give enough incentive to households to undertake waste
reduction e¡ort. The application of the principle thus invites the need to
study the exact nature of waste generation and the extent to which the
household waste reduction e¡ort is signi¢cant. Furthermore, as waste
services are frequently ¢nanced by £at rate taxes, the MC of waste
generation for the household is zero, which in turn prevents the
equalisation of MC of the various disposal technologies and hence the
e¤cient disposal of waste.
3.1 Categorisation of policy instruments
To help our understanding of how a waste management policy can a¡ect
economic incentives, it is useful to divide incentives into three categories as




Purchase-relevant (upstream) instruments are those that a¡ect the pricing
of the product which in turn generates waste. In ¢gure 1, the use of a
purchase-relevant instrument can shift MPC by changing the price of a
consumption good. These instruments a¡ect the incentives of consumers by
changing relative prices of consumption goods. Take, for example, a
packaging or production tax. Producers using the packaging can reduce the
tax payment on their product by reducing packaging material per unit of
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product whose price increases due to a packaging tax or purchase a product
that uses less packaging material. Purchase-relevant instruments therefore
a¡ect the incentives of both consumers and producers.
Discard-relevant (downstream) instruments are targeted at the waste
disposal stage. An example is a user fee for household waste collection and
disposal. This type of instrument will shift the MPC in ¢gure 1 by changing
the price of waste disposal services. Also if the user fee is charged on the
waste which goes to land¢ll, but not on the waste that is recycled, then it can
encourage more recycling. Facing a higher user fee for waste disposal,
consumers can reduce waste to be disposed of by exerting more e¡ort in
waste reduction and recycling although too high user fees can lead them to
choose the option of illegal waste disposal. Monitoring of and the penalty
for illegal waste disposal are thus discard-relevant instruments as well.
Another channel whereby discard-relevant instruments can a¡ect the amount
of waste is by altering consumption behaviour. For example, consumers
may change purchase decisions to buy goods that have a lower amount of
intrinsic waste.
Jointly-relevant instruments a¡ect both the purchase decision and the
discard decision. An example is the deposit-refund on bottles which is
employed in several countries throughout the world (Porter 1978; Bohm,
1981; Lee et al. 1988; Menell, 1990; Brisson, 1993): the consumer pays a levy
on the purchased product and receives a refund when the bottle or container
is returned after use. The objectives of this type of instrument are to reduce
the amount of waste entering the waste stream and to reduce the need for
the production of new bottles.
As Fenton and Hanley (1995) note, the dominant form of economic
analysis has been the assessment of individual instruments instead of
some complementary mix. An optimal waste management policy generally
requires the simultaneous consideration of instruments. For bottles and
containers, jointly-relevant instruments may be e¡ective as they can
change consumption without introducing the possibility of illegal waste
disposal. For other waste materials, the use of jointly-relevant instruments
is limited. Take, for example, food waste. As it is likely that the
household's waste reduction e¡ort can be signi¢cant for food waste, a
discard-relevant instrument such as a user fee should be chosen properly
to provide the incentive for waste reduction e¡ort. However, the user fee
in this case has its limits as it may lead to illegal waste disposal, which
will have to be monitored at additional social cost. A purchase-relevant
instrument can complement the use of these discard-relevant instruments
by changing consumption, and thereby the amount of waste to be
disposed of.
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From the foregoing analysis it has been shown that to introduce an e¤cient
household waste management policy requires policy-makers to be aware not
only of the costs and bene¢ts of implementing a given waste disposal tech-
nology but also its costs and bene¢ts relative to other disposal technologies.
The importance of these ¢ndings for Australia is that when setting policy
targets, such as the 50 per cent reduction in waste going to land¢ll, unless all
such costs and bene¢ts have been considered, there is no guarantee that
policy will be e¤cient. If this is not the case, then the various policy
initiatives are likely to yield sub-optimal outcomes. The important lesson for
Australian household waste management policy is to properly evaluate
proposed policy options and not to let unwarranted social pressures dictate.
4. Review of literature
In this section we review existing theoretical and empirical literature on
household waste management. Throughout this section, the focus will be on
how the policy instruments described above are incorporated in the literature
and how the suggested policies square with the basic economic principles
developed in the previous section. It will be shown that most existing
theoretical studies fail to address comprehensively the household waste
management problem. Consequently, conclusions drawn from these studies
are often applicable only to a limited class of household wastes. On the other
hand, the focus of the empirical research is primarily on the estimation of
household responses to discard-relevant instruments only, inviting further
research which incorporates other policy instruments as well.
4.1 Theoretical literature
For convenience, we divide the literature into two strands. The ¢rst strand of
literature pays attention primarily to the household's response to various
discard-relevant policy instruments. These policy instruments are given
exogenously so that the issue of optimal waste management policy is ignored.
The second strand of the literature characterises optimal household waste
management policies by determining policy instruments endogenously as the
solution to some optimisation problem. This approach incorporates the house-
hold's response to policy instruments within the optimisation framework.
Exogenous policy instruments
In Wertz (1976), a theoretical model is developed to study the demand by
households for solid waste disposal services. Wertz considers the impact of
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waste removal; the frequency of collection; distance to the nearest refuse site;
and household income. He shows that the utility from consumption needs
to be traded o¡ against the disutility associated with the waste generated
from consumption. Not surprisingly, consumption is negatively related to
the user fee for waste disposal and the disutility from the waste generated.
Following Wertz, Efaw and Lanen (1979) studied the household's demand
for waste disposal services, but with a focus on how households would
respond to container-based user fees. They assumed that the quantity of
waste is a function of the number of containers, which in turn is a function
of user fees and income. The important aspect of their paper relates to the
observation that the changes in user fees can be moderated by the household
if `stomping' (volume reduction) of waste is carried out. Thus a container-
based user fee system provides an incentive for the household to reduce the
volume of the waste produced but not necessarily the weight, which was also
noted by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996).
Using a household production model, Jenkins (1993) studied the
household's choice of e¡ort in terms of waste disposal and recycling. This is
an interesting and important choice faced by the household in that additional
time and e¡ort are needed for recycling as opposed to conventional disposal.
The more time that is needed for recycling reduces the time available for
leisure activities. She shows that the household will respond to positive waste
disposal fees by reducing consumption of goods that yield larger amounts
of post-consumption waste. However, for consumption goods producing
recyclable waste, whether the household will respond to positive disposal fees
by more recycling depends on the marginal value of leisure time foregone
for recycling relative to the size of the disposal fees. Overall, Jenkins shows
that the household will increase the time spent on recycling when faced by
positive user fees.
Morris and Holthausen (1994) also adopted a household production
model which they used to simulate policy alternatives. Like the previous
papers, they show that positive waste disposal fees encourage the household
to reduce waste, which is partly o¡set depending on the ease of recycling.
This model was further extended by Jakus, Tiller and Park (1996) in an
analysis of recycling by rural households. Jakus et al. note that the model
developed by Morris and Holthausen implied that individuals would pur-
chase a good for the additional bene¢ts derived by increased recycling. The
Jakus et al. model removes this behavioural anomaly. A fuller discussion of
the policy implications stemming from these papers is left to the next
section.
In sum, the papers reviewed in this section share several restrictive
features. First, attention is paid only to discard-relevant instruments such as
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to waste reduction or recycling only, omitting the option of illegal waste
disposal. Perhaps most importantly, the policy variables that are studied are
exogenously given which ignores the issue of optimal waste management.
To analyse optimal waste management, a more comprehensive approach is
necessary in which the household's response to policy instruments is
embedded in an explicit policy objective. The optimisation of this objective
over various policy instruments can then determine the optimal policy mix
endogenously.
9 The next section reviews the literature which undertakes this
task.
Endogenous policy instruments
Recently there has been a great deal of interest in which phase of the waste
chain at which to introduce appropriate forms of policy instruments.
Speci¢cally, the question asked is whether incentives should be introduced
through upstream purchase-relevant instruments or downstream discard-
relevant instruments. All the papers reviewed in this section have a common
feature in that several policy instruments are considered simultaneously.
The di¡erence between these papers is the generality with which policy
implications drawn from a theoretical model have applicability. For
example, Dobbs (1991), Dinan (1993), Palmer, Sigman and Walls (1997) and
Palmer and Walls (1997), concur with the optimality of jointly relevant
instruments such as a deposit-refund system. However, their optimal policy
is only applicable to a limited class of wastes. Fullerton and Kinnaman
(1995), and Choe and Fraser (1997, 1998) provide more general frameworks
where purchase-relevant and discard-relevant instruments are considered
together and in which the deposit-refund system emerges as optimal only in
a special case.
10 An important di¡erence, however, is that Fullerton and
Kinnaman did not consider the household's e¡ort to reduce waste and,
consequently, their model is another special case of the model studied by
Choe and Fraser.
11
9Some papers focus on the choice of disposal technologies only, assuming that the waste
generation process is exogenous. See Smith (1972), Keeler and Renkow (1994) and High¢ll
and McAsey (1997).
10It should be noted that the papers by Dinan (1993), Palmer, Sigman and Walls (1997),
Huhtala (1997) and Palmer and Walls (1997) are not speci¢cally focused on household
waste.
11For details of papers dealing with waste management from a production perspective
exclusively, see Miedema (1978), Copeland (1991), Jenkins (1993), Parry (1995) and Conrad
(1997).
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introduction of a virgin materials tax (Miedema 1983) but that the
arguments employed to justify this policy are misplaced. She develops a
model that shows that a virgin materials tax, used in isolation, is an
ine¤cient method of reducing waste but that the combination of a disposal
tax and reuse subsidy is e¤cient (deposit-refund). This is a form of jointly-
relevant policy instrument in that a tax is levied on producers of con-
sumption goods and a subsidy is given to end-users of recycled materials.
12
Dinan states that the deposit-refund approach is theoretically consistent with
household-based disposal fees, but that it has certain advantages in that
incentives for illegal disposal are removed. Palmer et al. (1997), in a partial
equilibrium analysis of waste generation and recycling, also argue that a
deposit-refund policy, equivalent to the type described by Dinan, is the most
cost e¡ective when compared to other policy options (i.e. an advance
disposal fee and a recycling subsidy). In a related paper, Palmer and Walls
(1997) consider the e¡ectiveness of employing recycled content standards as
a means to reduce waste. They ¢nd that recycled content standards su¡er
from many of the same problems as a virgin materials tax. They demonstrate
that it is possible to ¢nd an optimal recycled content standard if it is used
in combination with additional taxes or subsidies. However, implementation
of this policy portfolio is di¤cult to envisage. Again like Dinan, and Palmer
et al., Palmer and Walls (1997) advocate the use of a deposit-refund policy.
A basic limitation of this proposal is that a deposit-refund policy can only be
applied to certain materials in the waste stream for which recycling and reuse
possibilities are signi¢cant. This point is borne out in that Palmer et al. only
concentrate in their analysis on ¢ve common recyclable materials: paper,
glass, plastic, aluminium and steel. For some waste materials there is no
recycling or reuse possibility under current technological restrictions. In
addition, the transaction costs of implementing a deposit-refund policy are
high, although Palmer et al. using simulation analysis have shown positive
net bene¢ts from its implementation.
A paper that considers illegal disposal explicitly is Dobbs (1991). This
paper models the choice between two alternative waste disposal options for
the household ö littering and legal waste disposal. By considering the two
simultaneously Dobbs proposed that a refund or user subsidy should be
given for household waste disposal. The idea that a simple Pigouvian tax can
be employed to solve the existing externality is shown to be incorrect. Dobbs
shows that welfare gains are achieved using a combination of instruments,
12In the United Kingdom a system of recycling credits has been detailed in the 1990
Environmental Protection Act Part II (Turner, Ozdemiroglu and Steele 1995).
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Once this interdependence is recognised, the optimal user charge is `quite
likely to be negative' (p. 222). This instrument falls into the jointly-relevant
category of Fenton and Hanley (1995). The major problem with drawing
parallels with the deposit-refund system is that it is generally applied to
materials such as glass. As with Dinan (1993), Palmer et al. (1997), and
Palmer and Walls (1997), it is not a credible approach for materials that
simply need to be disposed of and for which high transaction costs are
incurred in implementation.
The approach to simultaneously considering economic instruments is
extended by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995). In this paper a comprehensive
general equilibrium model of waste management is developed. Like Dinan,
Fullerton and Kinnaman consider both production and consumption
decisions. However, unlike Dinan, they stress the potential problems of illegal
dumping by households in their model. With illicit dumping, a ¢rst-best
solution can be achieved by waste-end taxes on household waste and on illicit
dumping. However, they argue that a tax on illicit dumping is di¤cult, if not
impossible, to enforce and monitor. They propose that a zero tax on illegal
dumping is optimal, as long as the relative prices of all other policy instruments
are calibrated to yield the optimal outcome. Thus, they demonstrate that it is
possible to adjust the economic incentives on all other relevant activities,
inducing the ¢rst-best solution simply using relative prices. The ¢rst-best
solution removes the problem of dumping by manipulating other incentive
prices. With the dumping tax set equal to zero, the relative price of legal and
illegal disposal is found by subsidising legal disposal which acts as a cross-
subsidy on consumption, and so a tax on consumption is also necessary.
This solution characterises the di¡erence between upstream (purchase-
relevant) and downstream (discard-relevant) instruments to waste manage-
ment. Fullerton and Kinnaman use an upstream approach arguing that illicit
dumping cannot be enforced. The consumption tax is set at a rate to re£ect
the externality from illicit dumping and the tax is returned as a subsidy on
correct disposal. This in e¡ect amounts to another deposit-refund type
system. Like Dinan they rule out the use of a virgin materials tax except to
correct for any externalities generated as a result of production. They explain
that downstream taxes, including a tax on illegal dumping or burning, can
be used for the ¢rst-best solution in their model. However, an upstream tax
is easier to implement because of the informational di¤culties associated
with hidden actions ö illegal behaviour. As Fullerton and Kinnaman note,
however, the preferred solution is being determined as a result of illegal
actions by households: `The tail wags the dog, since illicit dumping is
corrected by multiple taxes on all inputs other than recycling, combined with
a subsidy on all output' (p. 87).
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and Kinnaman incorporate several strong assumptions. First, they allow
for the existence of recycling of some waste that can be reused in the basic
production process and they assume that this input can displace virgin
material. An important issue overlooked is the costs incurred in the
recycling process and the feasibility of substituting (First and Second Laws
of Thermodynamics) the recycled material for virgin inputs. The costs
incurred in recycling are not small (Baumol 1977; Fairlie 1992; Wills 1997)
and need to be included in a model of this type.
13 Second, the evidence that
exists about the feasibility of selling recycled materials is unclear. For
example, in the case of lead (Sigman 1995) and steel (O'Neill 1983) it has
been found that a market in secondary materials is feasible. This results
from the fact that the vast bulk of the waste is easy to collect (from a
factory, for example), is not contaminated by other waste materials and is
easy to transform into resaleable form. This can be contrasted with
household recycled waste which requires signi¢cant cost to collect, separate,
treat and to recover a usable resource. This corresponds with the ¢ndings
of the recycling programme in Banyule, Victoria. Also in the case of
plastics (Hadjilambrinos 1996), and paper (Nestor 1992, and Hanley and
Stark 1994), recycling is frequently unattractive from an economic
perspective, although in terms of social cost-bene¢t analysis there may be a
case for government support (Hanley and Stark 1994). It should be noted
that in the case of paper, recycling produces substantially more CO2 than
in the production of virgin paper, because virgin paper requires trees to be
grown which in turn sequester CO2 from the atmosphere (Industry
Commission 1996).
Although the models reviewed so far have incorporated a set of economic
instruments to improve household waste management, they pay insu¤cient
detail to the issue of e¡ort expended by economic agents in relation to waste
generation. Choe and Fraser (1997, 1998) have addressed theoretically the
issue of waste reduction e¡ort in a comprehensive modelling framework.
They simultaneously model the interaction of a producer, consumer and an
environmental agency. E¡ort expended by the producer and consumer in
relation to waste is modelled in terms of the type of waste generated. The
reason why this approach is taken is that for many waste materials, such as
packaging, the only decision faced by the household is legal or illegal
disposal. The choice of whether to recycle or reuse is not available. Similarly,
for many products a ¢rm cannot reduce the amount of waste intrinsic in
13An alternative approach to analysing resource use and waste management is a
materials-product chain analysis. Example are provided by Opschoor (1994) and Kandelaars
and van den Bergh (1997).
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signi¢cantly alters the optimal policy response in relation to kerbside
charges. In addition, unlike in Fullerton and Kinnaman, particular attention
is paid to the problem of illegal dumping by households and the necessary
monitoring and compliance incentives that need to be employed. The trade-
o¡ between the costs of monitoring, size of the ¢ne and the costs incurred by
households elsewhere in the waste chain is analysed. The most signi¢cant
result provided is that in relation to household waste: kerbside charges need
not be an optimal policy response. Under certain circumstances when the
waste can be recycled or reused, a kerbside charge may be optimal. For
many waste materials, however, it can be desirable to collect household
waste free while levying a tax on the waste component of the consumption
good. An optimal policy therefore depends on the type of waste and the
extent to which producers and consumers can take action to reduce waste.
The policy recommendation of Fullerton and Kinnaman therefore turns out
to be a speci¢c result of Choe and Fraser.
4.2 Empirical literature
In the previous section we considered the theoretical literature on household
waste management. Those papers that focus speci¢cally on household
responses to kerbside charges form the basis of empirical research into
various aspects of household waste management. It is the empirical results
provided by the literature on kerbside charges to which we now turn.
14 The
focus of the empirical literature has been the responsiveness of households to
the introduction of kerbside charges and recycling schemes. Most empirical
research has concentrated on the calculation of elasticities (own price,
income, cross-price) to assess the response to policy. Table 1 summarises the
elasticities generated in the literature to date.
As can be seen in table 1, the initial interest in household waste
management spawned several studies in the 1970s. Since then the focus of
empirical research has become sharper and the data sets constructed to
estimate elasticities better suited to answering speci¢c policy questions. The
form of econometric method employed has become more sophisticated
(Probit, Generalised Least Squares), and the use of speci¢cally generated
survey data has increased (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996). We will discuss
the implications of the ¢ndings reported in table 1, in publication date order,
for those studies of more importance.
14There is also a large empirical literature which considers deposit-refund schemes and
various aspects of recycling. See reference cited within.
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Authors Data and estimation method Dependent variable Price elasticities Income elasticities Cross-price elasticities
Fullerton and
Kinnaman (1996)
Individual Household Survey (1992),
Charlottesville, VI ^ Arc Elasticity
Calculations
ÿ0.076 (by weight)






Seasonally Adjusted Monthly Data
(1984-1991), Portland, Oregon ^ OLS





Household Survey (1990), Tompkins
County, NY ^ Probit




Simulation ^ Household Production
Model




Jenkins (1993) Panel Data, Cross-Section of 9
Communities (For more details see
table 5.1, pp. 64 Jenkins, 1993) ^ GLS
Quantity of residential waste
discarded per capita per day
ÿ0.12 0.41
Hong et al. (1993) Population and Household Survey





(ii) Quantity of household waste
(ii) `low' (inelastic) but statistically
insigni¢cant
(ii) 0.049
Skumatz (1990) Annual Average Revenue Data (1971^
1987), Seattle ^ OLS
Average annual residential




Monthly Data (4 years mid 1970s),
Three US cities ^ OLS/2SLS




Survey and Census Data (1972/1970),
Indianapolis, Indiana ^ OLS
Quantity of kth component in
pounds per household per week
0.242 (also have by
waste material)
Wertz (1976) (i) Cross-Sectional Data (1970),
16 suburbs Detriot- OLS (Income
Elasticity), (ii) San Francisco (1970) ^
Arc Price Elasticity
(i) Annual pounds refuse
collected per capita
(ii) ÿ0.15 (i) 0.279 and 0.272
McFarland (1972) Cross-Section Data (1967/68), 13 US
cities in California ^ OLS



























































































































8Wertz (1976) is among the important early studies shown in table 1.
15
From his theoretical model Wertz set out to test two hypotheses:
1. That the quantity of household waste varies negatively with a user fee;
and
2. That the quantity of household waste varies positively with income.
Wertz employed cross-sectional data for 1970 for ten suburbs of Detroit.
Using OLS he derived an income elasticity of waste of 0.279. The estimation
was repeated for six further suburbs in Detroit yielding a value of 0.272.
To test his hypothesis on demand for household waste services Wertz
collected only two data points for 1970, the quantity of waste discarded per
capita in San Francisco (699 pounds) and the quantity of waste discarded
per capita in all urban areas of the United States (937 pounds). San
Francisco was selected because its residents had to pay for waste disposal by
volume. From these an own price arc elasticity of demand for household
waste services of ÿ0:15 was found. An important shortcoming of this
analysis is that the empirical analysis does not distinguish between waste
generated and waste discarded. The empirical work considered the latter,
whereas the theoretical model considered the former. This is an important
distinction when faced with the prospect of recycling. Despite the limitations,
the ¢ndings of Wertz have proven to be a starting point for many subsequent
studies.
Efaw and Lanen (1979) developed a theoretical representation of the
household which was subsequently employed as the basis of their empirical
work. In this paper the data used were collected from three cities
(Sacramento (CA), Grand Rapids (MI), Tacoma (WA)). In each of the cities
households faced di¡erent types of user fees. They collected monthly data
for the 1970s for periods up to four years for each of the three cities. For
each city linear equations incorporating explanatory variables speci¢c to
each city were included. They found that demand for household waste
services did vary positively with income, but that the response of households
to user fees was statistically insigni¢cant. These results need to be treated
cautiously. First of all they faced general data problems which meant that in
some cases crude proxies needed to be employed in the estimation. Second,
and probably more importantly, each of the demand equations estimated
was an oversimpli¢cation in that expected explanatory variables were not
included. For example, Jenkins (1993), notes that, `A blatant oversight is not
considering the prices of goods that produce solid waste' (p. 21). Another
15The discussion of the earlier studies considered here, McFarland (1972), Wertz (1976),
Efaw and Lanen (1979) and Skumatz (1990), is based heavily on chapter 2 of Jenkins
(1993).
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and products. Jenkins further criticises this paper because the authors fail to
maximise the usefulness of their data. She argues that they should have
pooled the data to yield more e¤cient estimates.
Of the earlier studies McFarland (1972) used revenue per tonne as a crude
proxy for a user fee. As Jenkins (1993) notes, this is crude approximation
as average revenue will not re£ect the diversity of user fees amongst a
community. McFarland collected his data in 1967 and 1968 in thirteen cities
across California. The cities were selected because each employed user fees
and information on the quantity of household waste was available. The user
fee variable employed by McFarland is a service-level fee which does not
impose a positive cost on households for waste collection. Therefore, the
interpretation given by McFarland to his results can be considered to be
liberal. A similar proxy for price was employed by Skumatz (1990). In this
paper annual data (1971^87) was used in a way similar to McFarland,
although according to Jenkins the results derived are more consistent for the
latter period of the data set.
Jenkins (1993) used panel data (a cross-section of communities) to
estimate demand equation for household waste services. There were ¢ve
communities with user fees and four without to be used for comparison. The
di¤culty in constructing this data set is described by Jenkins and this can
be seen as a comment on the haphazard and limited information on this
subject at an appropriate level for carrying out serious empirical economic
analysis. The equations estimated by Jenkins relate to the theoretical model
discussed above. Using GLS Jenkins found that user fees were negatively
related to household waste production. As can be seen in table 1, the
elasticities results obtained by Jenkins are within the range of values reported
by other studies.
A very di¡erent approach to estimating household elasticities is the paper
of Morris and Holthausen (1994). In this paper a household production
model is used to simulate responses to di¡erent waste technology adoption
using calibration techniques. Morris and Holthausen estimate that waste
disposal service has an own price elasticity of between ÿ0:51 and ÿ0:6,
which is higher than the existing econometric literature would suggest. They
also ¢nd that the cross-price elasticity with respect to recycling is negative
and less than 1. However, the cross-price elasticity for waste reduction is
near to 1 or higher. Although these results would seem to be slightly at
variance with other studies this paper does provide an interesting alternative
approach to elasticity estimation.
A more conventional empirical study of household waste management is
that of Reschovsky and Stone (1994). They employ an econometric model to
analyse actual consumer responses to quantity-based pricing using survey
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New York. The survey was carried out in September 1990. Reschovsky and
Stone randomly selected 3040 households with 1422 returning. This county
was selected because it implemented a per-unit pricing system in March
1990. It did so on the assumption that households need incentives to
motivate participation. The dependent variables in the analysis are
dichotomous indicating recycling or not for a particular material type.
Independent variables include income, education and age. Given the form of
the dependent variable Reschovsky and Stone estimated their equations
using a Probit. As can be seen in table 1, the results derived are similar to
Wertz (1976).
Reschovsky and Stone allow household waste to be disposed of as rubbish
or recycled. They note that there may be an altruistic motivation for
recycling. However, mandatory recycling imposes an additional cost on the
household and frequently it leads to too much recycling. In relation to illegal
dumping Reschovsky and Stone's survey of the evidence suggests that much
of the illegal dumping that happens uses alternative disposal sources such
as roadside dumpsters. They were unable to ascertain a clear indication of
illegal dumping or burning though. They did, however, ¢nd that households
are sensitive to MPCs of waste reduction but that they are less sensitive to
the costs of waste disposal. This implies the need to have recycling e¡orts
along with quantity-based fees (volume or weight). Fees alone will be
unpopular and ine¡ective.
Hong, Adams and Love (1993) also consider the responsiveness of
households to price incentives to undertake recycling. They note that the
existing literature (Richardson and Havelicek 1974 and 1978; Saleh and
Havelicek 1975) identi¢es household income and size as important explan-
atory factors in the generation of household waste, as well as the disposal
services provided (Wertz 1976). The empirical results generated by Hong et al.
suggest that the income elasticity for garbage collection is less than 1.
Furthermore, they found that a user-fee for household waste disposal does
a¡ect recycling behaviour positively, reinforcing the ¢ndings of Reschovsky
and Stone (1994). It should be noted that the kerbside recycling service
employs zero marginal cost pricing. Interestingly, the responsiveness of
households to the user fee with respect to demand for waste services appears
to be insensitive to price increases. However, although there is no simple
association between income and aggregate household waste, there is a
relationship for separate parts of the waste stream. Hong et al. also observe
that a household is less likely to actually undertake recycling if a high degree
of e¡ort is required and that a bigger household is more likely to undertake
recycling and to demand more frequent waste collection. However, previous
work (see Jenkins 1993) has found that average household size is positively
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related matter Kemper and Quigley (1976) found that the number of
collection visits per year is not signi¢cantly related to the annual quantity of
waste discarded.
A di¡erent approach to estimating household demand for waste disposal
services is provided by Strathman, Rrufulo and Mildner (1995). In this paper
a distinction is drawn between the demand for waste collection services and
the demand for land¢ll disposal. An important observation relating back to
the analysis related to ¢gure 2 is made as a result of this distinction here.
Although there may exist e¤ciency gains from introducing marginal cost
pricing for waste collection, these will not be realised if the land¢ll disposal
price is below its opportunity cost. Strathman et al. also explain that
depending upon the focus of the research, di¡erent information is required to
estimate the demand for household waste disposal and the demand for land¢ll.
They note that the two demand estimates will be related and they use this in
their estimation of household demand for waste disposal services. Assuming
that land¢ll charges are passed on in full to waste collection charges, they




where ec and ed are the demand elasticities for collection and ¢nal disposal
and rd is share of ¢nal cost of disposal in price. Strathman et al. estimate a
demand equation using OLS, which is seasonally adjusted and corrected for
serial correlation. Their data are drawn from Portland and are monthly over
the period 1984 to 1991. The results of their estimation for land¢ll yield an
own price elasticity of demand of ÿ0:11. Based upon this estimate they ¢nd
that the household own price elasticity of demand using the speci¢ed
relationship is ÿ0:45. This is somewhat larger than estimates derived in
comparable studies. They suggest that this is because of data di¤culties, and
because in the residential area used in the study the ability of households to
illegally dump is high because it is a relatively large region. The ¢ndings of
Strathman et al. (1995) have been questioned by Nestor and Podolsky (1996),
who argue that the elasticity estimates derived are overestimates because no
allowance is made for substitute waste disposal options. Although in general
the criticisms are rejected by Strathman, Rufulo and Mildner (1996), they do
acknowledge that price-induced increases in illegal dumping do in£ate the
estimate for the price elasticity of demand for collection services.
Another econometric study of the household waste problem is provided
by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996). They study the behaviour of households
after the introduction of a unit pricing system for household waste disposal,
focusing on the incentives for illegal behaviour. Fullerton and Kinnaman use
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speci¢cally measured garbage (volume and weight)
16 rather than the weekly
number of bins contracted to assess `Seattle Stomp'. Also the weight of
recycled materials was measured, not just the frequency of collection. The
data were collected in Charlottesville, Virginia, which had just introduced a
unit pricing programme. Fullerton and Kinnaman surveyed 400 households,
o¡ering a US$5 incentive to complete the survey questionnaire. In total, 97
households agreed to participate. To avoid seasonal e¡ects Fullerton and
Kinnaman controlled the collection and adjusted their ¢nal results
accordingly. The own price elasticity estimates derived are smaller than those
found in previous research.
To measure illegal dumping Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) use two
proxy measures. They suggest that illegal dumping can account for between
28 and 43 per cent of the reduction in garbage after the introduction of user
pay schemes, con¢rming the ¢ndings of Reschovsky and Stone (1994).
Although Fullerton and Kinnaman consider illegal dumping extensively, a
problem with this study ö and others attempting to assess illegal dumping
ö is that it does not provide a direct measure of illegal behaviour. Fullerton
and Kinnaman do not know what action `dumping' actually describes,
although they provide some indirect verbal evidence about observed
increases in littering. However, it is unclear if this evidence can be relied
upon as responses might be perceived as opposed to real in the light of the
introduction of policy (prior belief is that there will be an increase in illegal
dumping and littering). Strathman et al. (1995) note that in the Portland area
local o¤cials when questioned did not know if illegal dumping had increased
because there appeared to be no jurisdiction monitoring and enforcing
sanctions for illegal dumping.
Many of the above empirical ¢ndings on household responsiveness to
waste charges have been used as the basis of cost-bene¢t analysis (CBA),
evaluating the overall social implications of implementation. The use of
CBA to evaluate many of the waste management policy options has been
high.
17 In terms of user charges existing results yield con£icting evidence.
Jenkins (1993) suggests that there exists a very large welfare gain from the
16Social costs of household waste disposal depend more on volume after compacting at
the land¢ll and are better proxied by weight at the kerb than by volume. Monash University
(1995) argued for weight over volume in that a more precise measure of waste is provided.
In addition, Monash note that volume-based systems discriminate against low density
waste.
17For example, in relation to the introduction of a deposit-refund system for beverage
containers, see Naughton et al. (1990), Alter (1993), Pearce and Turner (1993), and Brisson
(1993).
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Hicksian compensation measure which yields a value of US$117 a year to
make the representative household no better o¡ than it was before intro-
ducing unit pricing, curbside recycling, and a once-a-week collection. This
means that annual income would have to be reduced by US$117 which
therefore implies a substantial welfare improvement from the implementa-
tion of such a scheme. However, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) ¢nd that
the bene¢ts of unit pricing do not cover the administrative cost of
implementation, implying that the introduction of user fees is not an
economically sensible policy.
Finally, a new strand of empirical work has been emerging in the applied
literature. In rural areas the availability of public or private kerbside waste
services is limited and frequently non-existent.
18 There is a greater reliance
on drop-o¡ centres for waste and recycled goods. Several papers have
recently considered the motivation of households to participate in waste
recycling in this context. In the rural setting the decision to recycle cannot
simply be interpreted as means to avoid additional costs of waste disposal.
Instead it is suggested that recycling is undertaken for the `warm glow'
bene¢ts. These papers (Jakus et al. 1996; Jakus et al. 1997; Tiller et al. 1997;
Lake et al. 1996) have estimated the willingness to pay using several non-
market estimation techniques (Contingent Valuation and Travel Cost) for
recycling. A comparison of the ¢ndings of these papers provided by Tiller et
al. shows that the costs of providing the recycling service are signi¢cantly
outweighed by the bene¢ts accruing to participants.
4.3 Summary
In the preceding sections a comprehensive review of the literature on house-
hold waste management has been provided. Emerging from the literature are
several common themes of importance. First, to fully understand the
complex nature of the waste production and disposal chain, policy needs to
be evaluated within a comprehensive modelling framework. Otherwise it is
likely that recommendations can be made which are based on imperfect and
inaccurate representations of the actual operational environment. Fullerton
and Kinnaman (1995) and Choe and Fraser (1997, 1998) are attempts in this
direction. However, it should be noted that although the theoretical liter-
ature provides useful insights into the design of policy instruments and the
interdependence of the various participants, in too many cases the policy
recommendations that are o¡ered are of little practical relevance. This point
18Halstead and Park (1996) provide an overview of issues relating to waste management
in rural areas.
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refund schemes which in practice are subject to high transaction costs
resulting from administrative complexity.
Second, the empirical literature has shown the need to carefully develop
the necessary data to answer the questions of most interest. As the use of
speci¢c surveys has increased, more re¢ned estimates of household behaviour
have been produced. Interestingly, as table 1 shows, the range of price and
income elasticities estimates derived is wide; the available empirical results
therefore need to be treated cautiously. Thus, although the calculations of
Wertz (1976) are crude, they appear to provide a good ball park estimate for
the price elasticity for waste disposal serivces. Another point that needs to
be emphasised is that the number of studies is small. In terms of Australia,
there are at present no studies reporting price or income elasticities for the
introduction of kerbside charges. Also many of the empirical papers caution
against extrapolating from speci¢c case studies (for example Lake et al.
1996) and that there is a need for much more applied work in this area. Thus
in the context of introducing kerbside charges in Australia it is not at all
clear at what level a charge should be set. However, if kerbside charges are
to be introduced, it would appear to be sensible that e¡orts are made
to establish sensible elasticity estimates. Given the developments in the
empirical literature, the work of Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) provides a
useful methodology to follow. Finally, if there is to be a move towards the
introduction of kerbside charges for household waste disposal services in
Australia, then upstream taxes, monitoring and compliance costs for legal
disposal and appropriate recycling and reuse need to be considered
simultaneously.
5. Discussion and conclusion
The review of the theoretical and empirical literature almost seems to raise
more questions about the issue of household waste management than are
resolved. It is clear that the models, both empirical and theoretical, have
become more sophisticated through time. However, the complexity has
brought problems of interpretation, especially with the theoretical models. In
this section some of the major issues raised by this review are discussed in
terms of policy proposals and the implementation of legislation.
In the theoretical models considered here there has been a general trend
towards the use of taxes in terms of consumption decisions. This has in turn
yielded strong support for the introduction of deposit-refund type schemes.
Although this mechanism is shown to be e¤cient, the practical application of
this type of incentive structure is limited with numerous potential problems.
For example, the South Australian container deposit-refund scheme for
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costs of implementation may render the net impact of introducing a deposit-
refund scheme negative.
Associated with the deposit-refund recommendation, Fullerton and
Kinnaman (1995) argue that upstream taxes are appropriate. However, Choe
and Fraser (1997, 1998) have derived a similar result only as a special case
conditional upon the type of waste material produced by the household. For
speci¢c types of wastes such as food or many types of plastic, the deposit-
refund system is both inappropriate and ine¡ective in giving the household
incentives to undertake the e¡ort to reduce waste. This introduces the need
for user fees. On the other hand, user fees lead to the possibility of illegal
waste disposal. It is thus to be borne in mind that di¡erent waste materials
need to be managed by di¡erent policy instruments. In particular, neither the
deposit-refund system nor the kerbside charges should be viewed as a policy
with universal applicability.
The focus of analysis on the disposal decisions has in many ways
obscured the important issue, that of the consumption decision. This brings
the whole discussion around to the simple but powerful mantra so
frequently articulated by environmentalists ö reduce, reuse, recycle and
dispose. There is no reason to argue against this approach to waste
management. What must be guarded against, however, is an unquestioning
application without taking into account the very real economic costs
associated with the implementation of any policy. The particular point is
well illustrated in the case of Australia in relation to recycling and land¢ll.
Any choice of policy option will depend on the relative costs, both private
and social, and if land¢ll is the cheaper option then there is no reason for
pursuing the present recycling targets. The policy option is therefore an
empirical question of costing out the mix of speci¢c environmental
objectives.
From the empirical literature the reaction of households to kerbside
charges are as expected. Of the various elasticities calculated, the own price
elasticity of demand for household waste services is generally very low. This
is not altogether surprising as waste disposal services could be considered
to be essential and resulting price e¡ects will be small. However, these
elasticities might re£ect the low level of present charges. Importantly from a
policy implementation perspective, they imply that unless kerbside charges
are signi¢cantly higher than the present ¢xed payments, minimal household
response can be expected. Whether the political will exists to introduce the
necessary kerbside charges implied by the elasticity estimates remains to be
seen. Indirectly related to the introduction of kerbside charges, the measure-
ment of illegal dumping remains problematic, both in terms of assessing its
likelihood and monitoring its impact.
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the analysis for Australia. First, it is not su¤ciently clear if the introduction
of variable kerbside charges for household waste management will yield the
policy results that have been claimed by some organisations (e.g. Industry
Commission). To date, policy is ad hoc and there appears to be little chance
that a more comprehensive approach will be introduced. Thus whilst policy
in Australia remains an ad hoc a¡air, the likelihood that household waste
management policy will approach a second-best optimum is debatable.
Second, within the literature considered here it is implicitly assumed that
households live within a single jurisdiction, but in Australia, for example,
this is far from the case. Policy initiatives and strategies are formulated at
the Federal level, State governments then introduce legislation which in turn
enables local government to formulate and implement policy. This type of
government structure poses di¤culties in terms of e¤cient implementation
and the potential introduction of di¡erences in environmental regulation to
alter the prevailing economic incentives in favour of a particular area, region
or state. Furthermore, although local council can via a by-law introduce
kerbside charges for household waste disposal, it is clear from recent legal
decisions that the relationship between the States and Federal government in
relation to tax raising is unclear. Once this type of jurisdictional complexity
is added into the modelling structure, it is no longer clear if the optimal
economic properties presently derived will hold.
Third, and a related issue, there is a need to be aware of the di¡erence
in service provision for urban and rural households. In most of the literature
considered here, the focus has been on urban household waste management.
It is only very recently in the economics literature that speci¢c attention
has been paid to rural waste management. The dispersion of the rural
population in Australia is self-evident and any comprehensive household
waste management analysis needs to take this into consideration.
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